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Abstract
We argue that definite noun phrases give rise to uniqueness inferences character-
ized by a pattern we call definiteness projection. Definiteness projection says that
the uniqueness inference of a definite projects out unless there is an indefinite
antecedent in a position that filters presuppositions. We argue that definiteness pro-
jection poses a serious puzzle for e-type theories of (in)definites; on such theories,
indefinites should filter existence presuppositions but not uniqueness presuppositions.
We argue that definiteness projection also poses challenges for dynamic approaches,
which have trouble generating uniqueness inferences and predicting some filtering
behavior, though unlike the challenge for e-type theories, these challenges have
mostly been noted in the literature, albeit in a piecemeal way. Our central aim,
however, is not to argue for or against a particular view, but rather to formulate
and motivate a generalization about definiteness which any adequate theory must
account for.
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1 Introduction: two approaches to donkey anaphora
Sentences like (1) and (2) contain anaphoric relations that are surprisingly hard to
make sense of:
(1) Every man who owns a donkey pays taxes on it.
(2) Always, if a man owns a donkey, he pays taxes on it.
This donkey anaphora is the subject of a long and complex literature, and of this paper.
There are two major schools of thought about how to account for donkey anaphora:
dynamic approaches1 and e-type theories.2 Both approaches give a unified account of
definite descriptions (‘the donkey’, etc.) and pronouns (‘it’, ‘he’, etc.)—but in different
ways.3
Dynamic theories hold that definites in general (that is, definite descriptions and
pronouns) are essentially variables, which must be connected to a discourse refer-
ent that has been introduced by an appropriately placed indefinite (like ‘a donkey’).
On this view, sentences such as (1) and (2) include co-indexed variables which are
“bound” without c-command (i.e. without the kind of syntactic dominance which
permits binding in classical theories). To achieve this, the dynamic approach comes
with a structured view of contexts, on which they contain information about variables
in addition to propositional information. Both kinds of information can get updated
intrasententially (via non-classical treatments of conjunction, disjunction, and nega-
tion) and intersententially, as conversation proceeds.
E-type theories argue, instead, that definites have Fregean semantics: on these theo-
ries, definites presuppose there is a uniquely salient witness to their first argument. And
e-type theories hold that indefinites are just existential quantifiers. E-type theories fur-
ther argue that definites’ uniqueness presuppositions are sometimes invisible because
we evaluate them relative to very small points of evaluation (minimal situations). E-
type theories, unlike dynamic theories, do not come with a structured approach to
contexts, and do not come with non-classical treatments of conjunction, disjunction,
and negation (at least, the extant e-type literature does not argue for either of these,
1 See Karttunen (1976), Kamp (1981), Heim (1982) for the beginnings of this tradition, and Beaver (2001),
Nouwen (2003) for some significant recent developments and overviews. Dekker (1994) and Rothschild
(2017) provide close alternatives that hew more closely to standard semantic assumptions.
2 Geach (1962), Evans (1977), Parsons (1978), Cooper (1979), Neale (1990), Heim (1990a), Ludlow (1994),
Büring (2004), Elbourne (2005).
3 For this reason it would be misleading to characterize the e-type approach simply as the view that donkey
pronouns have the semantics of definite descriptions, because that commitment is common to (many versions
of) both views. Terminology in this area is notoriously confusing. ‘E-type’ is sometimes used as a name
for the phenomenon which we are calling ‘donkey anaphora’, rather than as a name for a particular class
of theories, which is how we are using it; and it is sometimes used for any theory of that phenomenon.
Also, it is never particularly clear in the literature what ‘dynamic semantics’ means (see Rothschild and
Yalcin 2015, 2016 for a different, narrower usage). We are, somewhat stipulatively but in line with much
of the literature, using ‘e-type’ and ‘dynamic’ in the way laid out presently. Our division of theories into
e-type and dynamic is (unavoidably) not exhaustive; e.g. Egli and von Heusinger’s (1995) choice-function
approach is static but without uniqueness presuppositions, so does not fit nicely into either category here.
We should emphasize, then, that one central aim of the paper is specifying a pattern that any theory of
anaphora must satisfy—however it is categorized—and that to our knowledge no extant theory does satisfy.
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and so implicitly presents itself as conservative in these respects; in the end we will
argue that an adequate e-type theory would in fact require both).
A central difference between these theories is that e-type theories ascribe uniqueness
presuppositions to definites, while dynamic theories do not. This difference, however,
can be hard to detect, because e-type theories’ use of minimal situations can make
these uniqueness presuppositions essentially invisible in some contexts. The empirical
focus of our paper is an examination of whether, and when, definites do in fact give
rise to uniqueness implications. We make two observations. The first, widely accepted
in the literature, is that definite descriptions do in general give rise to uniqueness (and
existence) inferences. The second is that these uniqueness (and existence) implications
are ‘filtered’ by preceding indefinites in the same way that presuppositions can be
filtered by preceding linguistic material (in the terminology of Karttunen 1973). We call
this latter phenomenon definiteness filtering; we call the overall empirical picture—the
combination of uniqueness inferences and their filtering—definiteness projection.
The bulk of our paper consists in marshaling evidence for our generalization, defi-
niteness projection, and arguing that e-type theories have serious difficulty accounting
for it. In the final part of the paper we turn to dynamic theories, where we make two
observations. First, dynamic theories predict some but not all instances of definiteness
filtering. Second, dynamic theories need to be supplemented in order to explain the
uniqueness effects that we do observe with definite descriptions.
The reason that we focus mainly on e-type theories here is that the shortcomings
of e-type accounts that we discuss have not been fully explored in the literature,
whereas the shortcomings of dynamic theories that we point to have already been
discussed in various different contexts. The purpose of our paper, however, is not
to adjudicate between these two sets of theories but to spell out and motivate an
empirical generalization, definiteness projection, and make clearer the problems that
both e-type and dynamic theories—but especially e-type theories—face in accounting
for this generalization. We hope our arguments will clarify a central desideratum for
any theory of the relationship between definites and indefinites.
2 E-type theories
In this section we will spell out the key features of e-type theories, which will serve
as our main foil throughout the paper, in more detail. The e-type strategy can be
characterized by the following key assumptions:
i) Definite descriptions have Fregean/Russellian semantics, according to which ‘The
F is G’ is true if and only if there is exactly one (contextually salient) F and all
Fs are Gs; indefinites have the semantics of existential quantifiers in classical first
order logic.
ii) Donkey pronouns, such as ‘it’ in (1) and (2), are, semantically speaking, definite
descriptions whose descriptive content is recovered in some way (pragmatically,
syntactically, or both) from context.4
4 There are some variations on this view on which pronouns are a special kind of definite description, as
in Evans (1977).
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Modern e-type views in general, and those which are our target here in particular,
incorporate two further, well-motivated assumptions: first, that the uniqueness and
existence implications of definite descriptions are semantic presuppositions;5 second,
that those presuppositions are evaluated not relative to whole worlds, but rather relative
to parts of worlds, or minimal situations. In the rest of this section, we will discuss the
motivation and implementation of these two assumptions in more detail.
2.1 Presuppositions
The first assumption, again, is that the existence and uniqueness implications of def-
inites are presuppositions, rather than simple entailments. The widely accepted test
for whether a bit of content is a presupposition is whether it projects through certain
environments—negation, left disjuncts, antecedents of conditionals, modals, etc.—
and similarly fails to project (is filtered) in appropriate environments (see Karttunen
1973, 1974; Stalnaker 1974; Heim 1983b for classic discussions). So the question
for our purposes is whether sentences like those in (3) communicate that there is a
uniquely salient professor of linguistics in Cologne; and whether the sentences in (4),
where uniqueness and existence are entailed in the relevant local environment, fail to
communicate this:
(3) a. The professor of linguistics from Cologne didn’t come to the conference.
b. Either the professor of linguistics from Cologne will come to the conference,
or the king of Spain will be annoyed.
c. If the professor of linguistics from Cologne comes to the conference, the
king of Spain will be pleased.
d. The professor of linguistics from Cologne might come to the conference.
(4) a. If there is a unique professor of linguistics from Cologne, then the professor
of linguistics from Cologne will come to the conference.
b. Either there is not a unique professor of linguistics from Cologne, or the
professor of linguistics from Cologne will come to the conference.
c. If there is a unique professor of linguistics in Cologne and the professor of
linguistics from Cologne comes to the conference, then the king of Spain
will be pleased.
Things pattern here exactly as predicted if existence and uniqueness are presupposi-
tions rather than entailed content—projection from the sentences in (3), and filtering in
the sentences in (4). The standard line in contemporary e-type work takes this evidence
at face value, and treats the uniqueness and existence content of definite descriptions
as presuppositions. Our criticism will only target such views, and we will use ‘e-type
view’ to denote specifically those e-type theories that take on this commitment. This
terminology is somewhat narrow, since there have been Russellian developments of
5 The idea that definite descriptions trigger presuppositions goes back to Frege and Strawson, but see Heim
(1991) for an authoritative statement of it.
123
Definiteness projection
the e-type view; but those views are in the minority, and leave it unclear how to make
sense of the data just summarized.
2.2 Situations
The second assumption of modern e-type semantics is that minimal situations play a
key role in the evaluation of definites.
We have just seen evidence that, if uniqueness implications are part of the meaning
of definites (a central commitment of e-type theorists), then they are presuppositions.
But when we look around a bit—in particular when we return to donkey anaphora—
this is prima facie implausible. To give a flavor of the problem, consider the donkey
sentences below, which spell out (1) and (2) with overt definite descriptions:
(5) Every man who owns a donkey pays taxes on the donkey he owns.
(6) Always, if a man owns a donkey, the man pays taxes on the donkey he owns.
It looks as if e-type theories, by way of their commitment to uniqueness presuppo-
sitions, are committed to the claim that (1) and (2), and their corresponding glosses
in (5) and (6), should trigger a uniqueness presupposition that every man who owns
a donkey owns exactly one donkey. This is because the standard assumption about
presupposition projection in the nuclear scope of quantifiers or the consequents of
conditionals is that any presuppositions of the material in that environment which are
not entailed by the restrictor/antecedent will project from the whole sentence. E-type
views take definites to presuppose existence and uniqueness, but take indefinites to
have classical existential semantics and thus to only entail existence—not uniqueness.
That means that it looks like, while existence presuppositions will not project out of
sentences like (1), (2), (5), and (6), uniqueness presuppositions will: all these sentences
will presuppose that the relevant men have at most one donkey.6 But this prediction is
wrong, as is already intuitively clear in these cases: a sentence like (5) or (6) could be
true of a group of men, each of whom owns more than one donkey, provided they each
pay taxes on each donkey they own. This can be brought out dramatically by looking
at sentences like Heim’s (1982) (7):
(7) Everybody who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with it.
If (7) presupposed that everyone, or even someone, who bought a sage plant bought
at most one sage plant, then (7) could only be true in the trivial case, i.e., if no one
bought a sage plant. But clearly (7) can be true in non-trivial cases—for instance, in a
case in which everyone who goes to the plant store buys nine sage plants. Somehow,
then, e-type theories will have to be modified so that uniqueness does not project from
donkey sentences.
The main response to this problem in the e-type tradition maintains that definites
do indeed have uniqueness presuppositions, but that they fail to project in donkey
6 Or at least that some relevant man has only one donkey; there is controversy about how the projected
presupposition is quantified (see e.g. Beaver 2001), but we can set this aside because sage plant sentences
(to be discussed below) make clear that either prediction is wrong.
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sentences because the definites’ presuppositions are evaluated relative to very small
points of evaluation, points which are small enough that uniqueness presuppositions
can be unproblematically satisfied in a local sense. In more detail: this approach treats
the uniqueness implications of donkey anaphora as relative to situations7 or events,8
rather than relative to whole worlds.9 The gist of the idea is that our donkey sentences
will end up having the meaning in (8):
(8) Every minimal situation s in which a man owns a donkey can be extended into
a larger situation s′ in which the man in s′ pays taxes on the donkey he owns
in s′.
Heim (1990a),10 using the situation-semantic framework of Kratzer (1989), sketches
a semantics which yields meanings like (8) for sentences with donkey anaphora. The
key point about this gloss is that the situation s′ in which we evaluate the definite ‘the
donkey he owns’ can be very small, and plausibly contains just one donkey, meaning
that the uniqueness presupposition is locally satisfied and thus will be filtered. Similar
moves can be made for conditionals: indefinites in the antecedent filter the existence
presupposition by way of their classical semantics; and by making the situations rel-
ative to which the definites/pronouns are evaluated suitably small, we can ensure that
the uniqueness presuppositions are also filtered.
As is well known, this approach still needs some refinement to deal with sage plant
sentences. The problem is that any situation that makes the nuclear scope of those
7 As in Heim (1990a), following Berman (1987), and most of the literature since, e.g. Büring (2004),
Elbourne (2005), Elbourne (2013). See Dekker (1997) for extensive discussion of the framework of minimal
situations. Dekker gives a translation between the talk of “cases” common in dynamic semantics and the
talk of situations in e-type semantics. But Dekker is bracketing issues about anaphora—he treats a limited
language without definites—so the existence of this translation does not by any means show that there is
a meaning-preserving translation between these theories once they incorporate definites, and thus does not
show there is no empirical difference between the predictions of e-type and dynamic theories, which (as we
are understanding these terms) encompass very different claims about the semantics of (in)definites. We
should emphasize that, as we understand it (and as Dekker emphasizes), dynamic semantics can be spelled
out in a way that incorporates situations: the essential difference between e-type and dynamic theories does
not concern whether there is a role for situations in the theory, but rather the treatments of (in)definites
sketched above.
8 As in Ludlow (1994), Schein (1993).
9 A different response to this problem suggested by Davies (1981) and Neale (1990) is to treat the definites
in question as ‘numberless’ descriptions (optionally plural rather than singular). On this idea, the pronoun
in (1) spells out not as just ‘the donkey he owns’, but also possibly as ‘the donkeys he owns’. The idea is
that this makes the uniqueness implication optional and hence not observable. But many of the readings of
donkey anaphora are not, in fact, equivalent to what we get with a plural description. Compare, for instance,
(i) with (ii):
(i) Every man who owns a donkey and pays tax on it is disgruntled.
(ii) Every donkey-owner who pays tax on the donkeys he owns is disgruntled.
For (i) to be true everyone who pays tax on at least one donkey he owns needs to be disgruntled, while
for (ii) to be true it seems we only need every donkey owner who pays tax on every donkey he owns to be
disgruntled. Other powerful arguments against the numberless view can be found e.g. in Kanazawa (2001).
10 References to Heim can be a bit confusing since Heim developed both one of the original dynamic
systems (1982) and a prominent version of the e-type theory that we discuss here (1990a); we try to specify
whenever it is unclear which publication we are referring to.
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sentences true will have nine sage plants in it, so the uniqueness of the definite in
the scope can’t be satisfied at that situation. So, somehow we need the uniqueness
presupposition of the definite in the scope to be checked relative to minimal restrictor
situations. In other words, we want a gloss along these lines:
(9) Every minimal situation s in which a person buys a sage plant can be extended
into a larger situation s′ such that the person who bought the unique-sage-plant-
in-s buys eight other sage plants in s′.
Here we evaluate the definite in the nuclear scope relative to minimal restrictor situa-
tions, which will thus satisfy the uniqueness presupposition of the definite when they
contain a corresponding indefinite. In Sect. 4, we provide a compositional implemen-
tation which gets us this desired co-variation between definites in the nuclear scope
and indefinites in restrictors.
For the rest of this paper we will focus our attention on e-type approaches which
are developed in this situation framework, as it is the best-developed version of the
e-type view and seems to us very well motivated by the present considerations. We
will, again, use ‘e-type’ somewhat narrowly to denote theories that are committed to
this situation-based (or event-based) framework and the presuppositional assumption
motivated in the last subsection, in addition to the two central planks above. Again,
we emphasize that our criticism does not touch views which do not make these first
two assumptions, but, again, those assumptions are well motivated, and are more or
less standard in contemporary e-type views.
3 Definiteness projection
Our central point contra e-type theories will be that this way of getting rid of trouble-
some uniqueness presuppositions by using minimal situations is too narrow. Glosses
like (9) eliminate uniqueness inferences by way of specially designed semantics for
quantifiers and conditionals which check the uniqueness presuppositions of definites
in nuclear scopes/consequents against minimal situations which satisfy the restric-
tor/antecedent. But presupposition projection and filtering is not limited to quantifiers
or conditionals; and the very same phenomena which motivate this move to minimal
situations for quantifiers and conditionals show up in a variety of other environments.
In general, we will now argue, indefinites can filter the uniqueness presuppositions of
definites; whereas e-type approaches predict that the uniqueness presuppositions of
definites will project even when there is a preceding indefinite, since indefinites entail
existence but not uniqueness.
In this section, we will argue in more detail for this empirical generalization,
explaining along the way why it is a serious problem for e-type theories. Then we
will explore how e-type theories might respond, and then we will explore the situation
for dynamic theories.
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3.1 Intersentential anaphora
We’ll come at this problem in a somewhat indirect way, by starting with cases
of intersentential anaphora. The lack of uniqueness implications in intersentential
cases formed one of the major motivations for Heim’s dynamic file-change seman-
tics (1982, 1983a) and Kamp’s discourse representation theory (1981). Heim (1982,
Ch. I.1), in particular, makes powerful arguments that the uniqueness presuppositions
predicted by the e-type account are unwarranted in cases of intersentential anaphora.
However, it seems to be assumed in the recent literature on e-type theories with sit-
uations, including Heim’s own later work, that adding situations to the e-type story
eliminates this problem. Here we argue that intersentential anaphora, in fact, still
presents a striking challenge to e-type theories, even if they are equipped with the
apparatus of situations. This issue is explored in more detail in work in progress by
Lewis (2019).
A reason why we might suppose that intersentential anaphora is not a problem for
e-type theories has to do with what has been called the problem of the formal link.
Consider this contrast:
(10) a. Laila is a bike-owner. ?It’s really old.
b. Laila owns a bike. It’s nice.
Both dynamic accounts and sophisticated e-type accounts can easily explain this con-
trast. Dynamic accounts explain it directly by dynamically binding the pronoun in
the second sentence of (10b) to the indefinite in the first; the lack of an indefinite in
(10a) accounts for the contrast above. In e-type stories the explanation instead goes by
way of conditions on how the descriptive material in pronouns is reconstructed from
preceding linguistic material: the hypothesized formal link between a descriptive pro-
noun and the preceding linguistic material that furnishes descriptive content (Heim
1990a; Neale 1990; Elbourne 2005). There are various ways of spelling out this idea;
we will simply grant for the sake of argument that one of these versions is successful
in accounting for the contrast between (10a) and (10b).
A theory of the formal link may help account for contrasts like those in (10), but
it misses a more basic problem about intersentential anaphora. That problem can be
seen most easily by focusing directly on definite descriptions, where no formal links
are needed.
To see the issue, consider the following example. Suppose that John works at a
coffee shop and is telling us about his day. He says one of the following:
(11) a. A couple came in today. It was a woman and a man. The man was being
so annoying.
b. A couple came in today. The man was being so annoying.
These passages are both felicitous. This is to be expected on an e-type story. In (11a),
the second sentence makes explicit that there was exactly one man, which ensures
that the uniqueness presupposition of the definite in the final sentence is satisfied.
Presumably, in (11b), we can easily accommodate the same assumption when we come
to the definite, again ensuring that its presupposition is satisfied (accommodation is the
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process by which required presuppositions are quietly added to the common ground;
see von Fintel (2008) for an overview).
Now consider these two variants:
(12) a. Several couples came in today. There was one, a woman and a man. The
man was being so annoying.
b. #Several couples came in today. The man was being so annoying.
Consider first (12b). The definite in the final sentence is jarring. Intuitively, we just
don’t know which man the speaker is talking about. This is nicely predicted by e-type
theories: ‘the man’ presupposes there is a uniquely salient man, but the first sentence
in (12b) makes several distinct men salient, meaning that this presupposition will not
be satisfied; nor is it as easy to accommodate the presupposition in (12b) as in the
case of (11b) (one would have to accommodate the presupposition that all but one
of the couples were lesbian couples, which is an odd thing to presuppose without
comment).11
But now consider (12a). (12a) is strikingly more felicitous than (12b). But how
can e-type theories make sense of this? On reflection, it’s not at all clear. The only
difference between the two variants (12a) and (12b) is the addition of an intervening
sentence, ‘There was one, a woman and a man’, in the former. But this clearly does
not entail that there was only one man in the whole group (to see this, note that
this intervening sentence could coherently be followed with ‘There was another, two
men. . . ’). If the uniqueness presupposition of ‘the man’ is satisfied in (12a), then
we will have to say that this intervening sentence makes salient a unique man. But
how does it do this? After all, this sentence doesn’t tell us anything about the man in
question. On reflection, it seems that the uniqueness presupposition of the definite in
(12a) should be just as jarring as it is in (12b).
One thing e-type theories could say here is that we generally interpret a definite like
‘the man’ relative to a minimal situation which makes the preceding sentences true.
The problem is that this does not distinguish (12a) from (12b), since minimal situations
which make the preceding sentences true will be just those minimal situations in which
several couples came in.12 A different response would be to say something like this:
an individual can count as uniquely salient just by virtue of being the one that the
speaker intends to refer to; and indefinites can make it clear that the speaker has in
mind a uniquely salient individual, even if they don’t give us any information about that
individual (see Stalnaker 1998). But at this level, it’s still not clear how this response
distinguishes (12a) from (12b). After all, why don’t we just charitably interpret an
out-of-the-blue definite as in (12b) as communicating, inter alia, that there is a man
the speaker has in mind and is going to tell us about?
11 Note that these observations go against the claim made by Evans (1977) and Kadmon (1987, 1990) that
definite descriptions and pronouns generally come with uniqueness implications even when in positions of
dynamic binding. While there may be some cases of bound pronouns or definite descriptions giving rise to
uniqueness inferences such as in the examples given by Evans and Kadmon, we think these cases are rare
and should be explained by other mechanisms. For related early discussion see Heim (1982, Ch. 1)
12 We could say we look at minimal situations which make only the preceding sentence true, but this
won’t help, since we could add a sentence in between the second and third in (12a) without degrading the
sequence: ‘. . . There was one, a woman and a man. It was early in the day. The man . . . ’.
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Perhaps there is something to say here.13 We will not argue at length that e-type
theories cannot account for the contrast in (12) (again, see Lewis 2019 for more dis-
cussion of these issues). Our main point will be a different one. E-type theories face a
very general problem, of which (12) raises the simplest instance of namely, explaining
how indefinites in presupposition-filtering positions can filter the uniqueness implica-
tions of definites, as in (12a). Let us reiterate that this problem is quite distinct from
the problem of the formal link. Indeed, we have spelled out the problem with overt
definite descriptions rather than pronouns, so it’s not even clear that a formal link plays
any role in these sentences; even if we want to say that definite descriptions can also
have covert material drawn from preceding sequences, it’s clear that this won’t help
explain the contrast between (12a) and (12b).
3.2 Definiteness projection, schematically
Our main point is the following: indefinites appear to filter the uniqueness presupposi-
tions of definites. This is the phenomenon we call definiteness filtering. Schematically,
let ‘∃FG’ abbreviate an indefinite sentence like ‘An F is G’ and let ‘ιF H ’ abbreviate
a definite sentence of the form ‘The F is H ’ or ‘He/she/it is H ’, in cases where the
latter is intuitively interpreted the same way as the former. Let F (·, ·) range over
functions that take a pair of sentences to a sequence of sentences, with the property
that the first argument filters the presuppositions of the second in that sequence—so
F (ϕ, ψ) could be ϕ and ψ, or Not ϕ or ψ, or S wants ϕ. S wants ψ ., and so on
(more on sequences like this presently). With this terminology in hand, we can restate
our basic observation more precisely:
Definiteness projection:
– Definiteness filtering: A sequence of the form F (∃FG, ιF H) does not commu-
nicate that there is a uniquely salient F .
– Uniqueness inferences: By contrast, a sequence of the form F (ϕ, ιF H) generally
does communicate that there is a uniquely salient F whenever ϕ does not contain
an indefinite of the form ∃FG.
From the point of view of e-type theories, the first part of this generalization, definite-
ness filtering, is surprising. On e-type theories, indefinites have a classical existential
semantics; and definites presuppose both existence and uniqueness. On standard theo-
ries of presupposition projection, in a sequence of the form F (ϕ, ψ), ϕ filters exactly
the presuppositions of ψ which it entails; the other presuppositions of ψ project.14 So
in the context of an e-type theory, we would expect indefinites to filter just existence,
13 See again Stalnaker (1998), for instance, for a development of the idea that indefinites implicate that the
speaker has someone in mind, and Lewis (2013) for further criticism.
14 In fact the standard prediction is a bit more subtle: namely, that the presuppositions of ψ project
conditioned on ϕ. However, this is a notoriously problematic prediction (the so-called proviso problem; see
e.g. Geurts 1996; Heim 2006; Mandelkern 2016); it is well known that what in fact is felt to intuitively
project is the set of unconditional presuppositions not entailed by ϕ. We will assume here, and throughout,
that we have an underlying theory of presupposition that provides some solution to the proviso problem,
and hence will ignore this subtlety, which in any case does not effect our main point.
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not uniqueness. As we have seen, e-type theories give special semantics for quantifiers
and conditionals to account for definiteness filtering in those cases. But this is a local
solution to what we will argue is a global problem. (In Sect. 4, we will explore to what
degree the local solution proposed for quantifiers and conditionals, involving minimal
situations, can be extended across the board.)
The argument of this section in turn yields a new perspective on the observation
about intersentential anaphora made just now. That observation could easily be inter-
preted as an observation about discourse-level pragmatics: for an e-type theory to
account for that observation (it would be natural to think), we must simply couple
it with the right story about the evolution of discourse-level salience properties. The
observations in the rest of this section will show this reaction to be wrong. On the
contrary, the intersentential problem is just one instance of a much more pervasive
phenomenon, in which indefinites filter uniqueness presuppositions across the board.
The rest of this section will be dedicated to showing that definiteness filtering occurs
across a wide variety of different filtering environments. This risks tedium, but it is
important to see that the phenomenon is indeed a global one that is robust across
different presupposition-filtering environments.
3.3 Conjunctions
We begin by considering conjunctions. Left conjuncts filter the presuppositions of
right conjuncts, so (13a) does not presuppose that Susie used to smoke, whereas (13b)
does:
(13) a. Susie used to smoke and she stopped.
b. Susie ran a marathon and she stopped smoking.
So conjunctions with the form ϕ and ψ presuppose all the presuppositions of ψ
which are not contextually entailed by ϕ. We can thus compare conjunctions with the
form ∃FG and ιF H to conjunctions with the form ϕ and ιF H for some other ϕ,
like (14) and (15), respectively:
(14) John met a woman at the party and John liked [her/the woman].
(15) John enjoyed the party and John liked [her/the woman].
Recall that e-type theories treat ‘her’ in an environment like (14) as equivalent to
a definite description which presumably will be spelled out as something like ‘the
woman’, so we can move freely between these variants. On its own, conjunction cannot
show us a great deal about projection, since a conjunction entails both its conjuncts,
which makes it impossible to directly distinguish simple entailments of the conjunction
from its presuppositions. But we can distinguish these by embedding conjunctions
in environments which (i) cancel entailments but (ii) are holes for presupposition
projection. Then, if some content is just an entailment of a conjunction, we will no
longer infer that content; whereas if it is a presupposition of the conjunction, we will.
One such environment is the antecedent of conditionals: (16a) does not lead us to
infer that Susie used to smoke, whereas (16b) does:
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(16) a. If Susie used to smoke and she stopped . . .
b. If Susie ran a marathon and she stopped smoking . . .
So we can embed our target sentences in the antecedents of conditionals, as in (17a)
and (17b):
(17) A: John met a woman at the party.
a. B: Well, if John met a woman and John liked [her/the woman], he’ll be
happy he went to the party.
b. B: Well, if John enjoyed the party and John liked [her/the woman], he’ll
be happy he went to the party.
The key question to now ask is whether (17a) or (17b) presupposes that there is
a uniquely salient woman—in other words, whether this presupposition of ‘her/the
woman’ projects out of each of these sentences (which would show that it projects out
of the relevant conjunction). We can’t really tell from these two sentences, since A’s
set-up can be naturally interpreted to make a unique woman salient (the one he met), so
the presupposition would be satisfied in any case. But we can vary the context set-up,
to make explicit that John may have met more than one woman. Then, if uniqueness
projects, we should find a clash with the context. So consider (18):
(18) A: John met one or two women at a party.
a. B: Well, if John met a woman and John liked [her/the woman], he’ll be
happy he went to the party.
b. B: # Well, if John enjoyed the party and John liked [her/the woman], he’ll
be happy he went to the party.
Given this plural contextual set-up, there is a striking contrast between (18a) and
(18b): the latter is infelicitous, while the former is still good. (17) and (18) constitute
a minimal pair: the only change is that in the context for the first there is plausibly a
uniquely salient woman, while in the second case there is not. Since both variants—
(18a), with an indefinite preceding the definite, and (18b), with a definite but no
indefinite—were felicitous in the set-up in (17), this suggests that the infelicity of
(18b) follows specifically from the fact that no unique woman is made salient in the
set-up in (18). This diagnosis of the weirdness of (18b) is confirmed by the fact that a
natural reaction to (18b) is ‘Hey wait a minute, I thought you said that John met one or
two women at the party!’ (see von Fintel 2008 for this test). All this, in turn, suggests
that a conjunction containing a definite without a preceding indefinite, as in (15),
presupposes uniqueness, while a conjunction with a definite following an indefinite
does not, as in (14).
The same points can be made with conjunctions in the consequents of conditionals.
Compare:
(19) A: John was supposed to go to a party with [a woman/one or two women] he
has been chatting with online.




b. B: If John went to the party, then he apparently enjoyed the party and he
liked [her/the woman].
The key observation here is that (19b) is infelicitous in the plural context (‘one or
two women’), whereas all other variants are felicitous. This provides more evidence
that (15), but not (14), presupposes uniqueness, since the standard assumption is that
conditionals presuppose the presuppositions of the consequent which are not entailed
by the antecedent.
Similarly—unsurprisingly—we find further evidence for this from conjunctions in
the restrictors of quantifiers. Thus compare:
(20) The men in my class went to a party, and most men met [a woman/one or two
women].
a. Every man who met a woman and liked [her/the woman] is happy he went
to the party.
b. Every man who enjoyed the party and liked [her/the woman] is happy he
went to the party.
Again, (20b) is infelicitous in the plural context, while all other variants are felicitous.
This, together with the assumption that presuppositions project out of the restrictors of
quantifiers,15 provides further support for the claim that (15), but not (14), presupposes
uniqueness. We invite the reader to find more evidence by embedding the correspond-
ing conjunction in the nuclear scope of quantifiers, attitude ascriptions, modals, and
so on, but the verdict seems clear enough for us to stop here.
This puts us in a position to spell out in more detail the problem for e-type theories in
the context of conjunction. Again, according to standard theories of presupposition, the
presuppositions of a right conjunct project out of the conjunction as a whole unless they
are entailed by the left conjunct (plus contextual information). As we know, on e-type
theories, ‘her/the woman’ presupposes that a woman exists, and that there is a uniquely
salient woman. ‘A woman’ entails existence, but, of course, not uniqueness. In other
words, existentials in left conjuncts should be able to filter existence presuppositions,
but not uniqueness presuppositions. So it looks like e-type theories should predict
that both ‘John enjoyed the party and John liked [her/the woman]’ and ‘John met a
woman and liked [her/the woman]’ presuppose that there is a uniquely salient woman.
This prediction looks correct for the former but, crucially, not the latter conjunction:
it appears that indefinites can filter the uniqueness presuppositions of definites.
An important worry to discuss at this point concerns the logical form of our con-
junctions. We have assumed that we are dealing with conjunctions of the form ∃FG
and ιF H; but what if our conjunctions instead have the form ∃x F : (G and ιx F H ),
with the indefinite scoping over the whole conjunction and somehow binding a covert
variable in the definite? In other words, we have assumed that our conjunctions have
the form ‘John (met a woman) and (he liked the woman)’; but what if they instead
have a form along the lines of ‘a womanx (John met x and liked thex woman)’?16 If
15 It is uncontroversial that they project in at least some manner—existential or universal—which is all
we need for the present.
16 Thanks to Yasu Sudo and Karen Lewis for raising this objection and for subsequent discussion.
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that were so, there would be no puzzle about why these conjunctions do not project
uniqueness, while the corresponding definite conjuncts on their own do. But we think
there are a few reasons to think this is not a plausible response. First, as we will see
in a moment, it is too local, given that our problem extends beyond conjunction to
many cases where no similar response is available. Second, even when it comes to
conjunction, we can vary our examples in a way that renders this response untenable,
for instance by adding an exceptive clause to our key sentence:
(21) A: John met one or two women at the party.
B: If John, but not Mark, met a woman, and John liked [her/the woman], John
will be happy he went to the party.
Adding this exceptive clause doesn’t change judgments about felicity: (21) seems not
to project uniqueness, since it is felicitous in this plural context. The most prominent
interpretation of (21) says that John will be happy provided that (i) John met a woman
x and (ii) Mark didn’t meet any woman and (iii) John liked x . But if the indefinite
took scope over the conjunction, then of course we would get a different meaning:
namely, that John will be happy provided that there is a woman x such that (i) John
met x and (ii) Mark didn’t meet x and (iii) John liked x . Of course, this latter reading
is available, though dispreferred. The key point, though, is that on the first (more
prominent) reading, we don’t get projection of uniqueness. But to obtain that first
reading, we must assume that the indefinite does not take scope over the conjunction
(if it did, we would only get the second reading). Thus this scopal escape route isn’t
available in cases like this one.17
If we accept the pattern in question, how could e-type theorists respond? Can small
situations help us here, as they did for filtering between the restrictor and nuclear scope
of quantifiers, and likewise between the antecedents and consequents of conditionals?
It is tempting to think that all we care about when we evaluate a conditional, or
quantifier, are minimal situations which make any part of it true—and that we simply
ignore the situations that make definites undefined. But the problem with this, of
course, is that, while it would eliminate the uniqueness presuppositions of ∃FG
and ιF H, it would also eliminate the uniqueness presupposition of ιF H. In other
17 An anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that, on an elision approach to exceptives (as in
Vostrikova 2019), we might be able to say that the pronounced indefinite takes high scope over the conjunc-
tion in (21) while the elided indefinite in the exceptive takes low scope. But in general this kind of scope
configuration doesn’t seem possible for exceptives: when the pronounced indefinite unambiguously takes
high scope, we do not seem to get a reading where the indefinite in the exceptive takes low scope. To see
this, consider (i):
(i) If there’s a woman who John met, but Mark didn’t, then Mark will be jealous.
If it were possible for the indefinite in the exceptive to take low scope while the pronounced indefinite takes
high scope, then this should have a reading where it means (ii):
(ii) If there’s a woman who John met, but Mark didn’t meet a woman, then Mark will be jealous.
But (i) doesn’t seem to have this reading. So even if exceptives are derived by elision, it looks as if (somewhat
unsurprisingly) the scope of indefinites must be preserved in the elided portion, and so (21) could not have
a reading where the pronounced indefinite scopes high and the elided indefinite scopes low.
123
Definiteness projection
words, it would not help capture the contrast that needs to be captured.18 A more
local solution would develop a sort of pseudo-dynamic conjunction, which passes on
minimal left-conjunct-witnessing situations for the right conjunction to evaluate; in
Sect. 4 we discuss a proposal along those lines, arguing that while it might work for
conjunction and disjunction, it cannot be conservatively generalized far enough.
3.4 Disjunctions
We turn next to disjunctions. The standard assumption about projection across dis-
junction is that presuppositions of a right disjunct are filtered by the negation of the
left disjunct: that is, ϕ or ψ has all the presuppositions of ψ except those which
are contextually entailed by Not ϕ. So (22a) does not license the inference that she
used to smoke, while (22b) does:
(22) a. Sue never smoked, or she stopped.
b. Sue didn’t run a marathon, or she stopped smoking.
So the relevant comparison for present purposes will be between sentences of the form
Not(∃FG) or ιF H versus ϕ or ιF H, where ϕ is not a negated indefinite, as in
(23):
(23) A: I heard from John that Sue met [a girl/a few different girls] this fall.
a. B: Really? Well, she came to Thanksgiving by herself, so either she didn’t
actually meet a girl, or else she didn’t like [her/the girl] enough to bring
her to Thanksgiving.
b. B: Really? Well, she came to Thanksgiving by herself, so either she didn’t
want her mother to get involved, or else she didn’t like [her/the girl] enough
to bring her to Thanksgiving.
Once again, our two contexts provide us with a minimal pair. With the singular con-
text, both variants are felicitous; in the plural context, only the first is. This suggests
that uniqueness is filtered by the negated definite in (23a), but projects in (23b)—
conforming to the general pattern we are arguing for here: indefinites filter uniqueness
presuppositions.
Let us again consider, and again reject, the idea that this issue has something to do
with the problem of the formal link. E-type theorists might argue that there is material
in the indefinite sentences (‘meet a girl’) that is lacking in the indefinite-free variants.
Perhaps, the e-type response might go, that material provides a suitable antecedent
for elided material in the definite, accounting for the contrast between the variants;
in that case, this would be just another species of the formal link problem. But the
examples were carefully constructed so that the indefinite sentence didn’t introduce
material that was not already in the context sentence. In any case, we can make this
material overtly available, as in (24), without any improvement in felicity:
18 Cf. Büring’s (2004) closely related point that indefinites and definites in general end up being indistin-
guishable in the antecedents of conditionals if we rely in the wrong ways on minimal situations.
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(24) A: I heard from John that Sue met a few different girls this fall.
B: # Really? Well, she came to Thanksgiving by herself, so either she didn’t
want her mother to get involved, or else she didn’t like the girl she met enough
to bring her to Thanksgiving.
Similar points go for the other examples we consider throughout this section: we do
not see how appeals to formal links can help account for these contrasts.
Disjunction is a somewhat complicated case. In order for a disjunction with the
form There’s not an F , or the FG to be felicitous, it must remain open that there
is no F . In order to test whether uniqueness projects in these cases, we need to also
leave open the possibility that there is more than one F . We achieved this in (23) by
ascribing to a possibly dubious source the information that Sue met one girl/a few
different girls. We can also achieve this by embedding disjunctions in the scope of
quantifiers or the consequents of conditionals. Consider first the quantified sentence
in (25):
(25) Some of my friends have joined Tinder. Some of them have gone out with one
girl [and some with several]. But I didn’t meet any of their dates at my party.
a. So all of my friends either didn’t meet a girl or else didn’t bring [her/the
girl] to my party.
b. So all of my friends either aren’t on Tinder or else didn’t bring [her/the
girl] to my party.
Consider next the conditionals in (26):
(26) A: Some of my friends have joined Tinder. Some of them have gone out with
one girl [and some with several]. But I didn’t meet any of their dates at my
party.
B: I see. So if Sue is in your friend group, then. . .
a. either she didn’t meet a girl or else she didn’t bring [her/the girl] to your
party.
b. either she isn’t on Tinder or else she didn’t bring [her/the girl] to your
party.
In both these cases, when the plural context set-up in brackets is omitted, both con-
tinuations are fine. Whereas when it is included, only the first variants, with a negated
indefinite in the left disjunct, are acceptable. This provides further evidence that
negated indefinites can filter uniqueness across disjunctions.
3.5 Attitudes
Attitude reports provide another filtering environment to test our hypothesis that indef-
inites filter uniqueness. There are a variety of different ways we can use attitude reports
to test this. One helpful paradigm comes from ‘want’-‘want’ sequences: in sequences
of the form S wants ϕ. S wants ψ ., ϕ filters any presuppositions of ψ which it
entails, while other presuppositions project (thus e.g. ‘Sue wants to have a guitar. She
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wants to play her guitar in a band’ does not presuppose that Sue has a guitar, while
‘Sue wants to be in a band. She wants to play her guitar in the band’ does).19 So we
can compare sequences of the form S wants ∃FG. S wants ιF H . versus S wants
ϕ. S wants ιF H . in uniqueness and non-uniqueness environments, as in (27):20
(27) Mark told me he is going to meet [a guy/one or two guys] at a bar.
a. He wants to meet a man. He wants [him/the man] to be interesting.
b. He wants the bar to be nice. And he wants [him/the man] to be interesting.
Once again, we find a contrast here between (27b), in the plural context, and the other
variants: (27b) is infelicitous in the plural context, which suggests that it presupposes
that there is a uniquely salient man, while (27a) is felicitous in both contexts, suggesting
that the presupposition is filtered there—again supporting our claim that, in general,
indefinites filter uniqueness for definites. We leave it to the reader to explore similar
patterns with other attitude predicates, like ‘hope’-‘hope’, ‘wish’-‘wish’, and so on.
3.6 Modals
Necessity modals, like attitude predicates, create filtering environments: where ‘’ is
a necessity modal, in a sequence ϕ. ψ , ϕ will filter any presuppositions of ψ
which ϕ entails; other presuppositions will project (so ‘You must stop drinking. You
must then stop smoking’ presupposes that you smoke, while ‘You must start smoking.
You must then stop smoking’ does not). Thus we can compare ∃FG. ιF H . with
ϕ. ιF H . and see whether uniqueness projects from one or both of these. Once
again, we find evidence that the indefinite filters uniqueness. Here is a paradigm that
shows this with an epistemic necessity modal:
(28) A: I think Liz had [a baby/a baby, or maybe even twins].
B: Yeah, I saw her and John buying diapers; she looked tired.
a. She must indeed have had a baby. Taking care of [it/the baby] must be
overwhelming.
b. She must be getting help from John. Still, taking care of [it/the baby] must
be overwhelming.
Again, the variant without the indefinite, in (28b), is infelicitous in the plural context,
whereas the variant with the indefinite in (28a) is not, providing further evidence that
indefinites filter uniqueness.
19 There is controversy, related to the proviso problem mentioned above, about whether this projection is
unconditional, or whether projection is conditioned on the beliefs of the attitude holder and unconditional
“projection” follows as a secondary inference; but this won’t matter for our purposes (Heim 1992; Geurts
1998; Sudo 2014).
20 Elbourne (2005, Sect. 2.6.2) discusses sequences like (27a), but does not give an account of their
meaning and does not note the problem they raise concerning uniqueness.
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We find a similar pattern with other kinds of necessity modals, as with deontic
necessity modals:
(29) John adopted [a cat/one or two cats].
a. In fact, he had to adopt a cat; he had to adopt [her/the cat] to keep his
mother company.
b. He had to find a way to keep his mother occupied; so he had to adopt
[her/the cat] to keep his mother company.
Once again, the variant without the indefinite is is infelicitous in the plural context,
whereas the variant with the indefinite is felicitous.
3.7 Generalized sage plant sentences
The last part of our argument for definiteness projection generalizes Heim’s (1982)
argument from sage plant sentences like (7), repeated below:
(7) Everybody who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with it.
Recall that Heim used this sentence to argue that pronouns like ‘it’ in (7) cannot
possibly project uniqueness, as this would render the sentence trivial. We can gen-
eralize Heim’s approach to provide a different strategy for arguing that indefinites
filter uniqueness in all the projection environments we have considered so far. To see
this, consider the following variations on (7), which extend the sage plant paradigm
to conjunction, disjunction, ‘want’ sequences, and modal sequences.
(30) Sue bought a sage plant and bought eight others along with [it/the sage plant].
(31) Either Sue didn’t buy a sage plant, or she bought eight others along with [it/the
sage plant].
(32) Sue wants to buy a sage plant. She wants to buy eight others along with [it/the
sage plant].
(33) Sue has to buy a sage plant. She has to buy eight others along with [it/the sage
plant].
These sentences are all perfectly coherent. This coherence provides independent
evidence that definites like ‘it’/‘the sage plant’ do not project uniqueness in these
environments. If they did, these sentences would be incoherent in different ways. (30)
would be simply inconsistent, since it can’t be that Sue bought exactly one sage plant
along with eight other sage plants. (31) would be incoherent in that the second dis-
junct would be trivially false—Sue can’t possibly have bought eight sage plants along
with the unique sage plant she bought. (32) would ascribe incoherent desires to Sue.
And (33) would ascribe incoherent requirements to her. None of these sentences are
incoherent in this way. These judgments of coherence seem very clear to us. This
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provides yet another argument that indefinites can filter uniqueness, not just between
a restrictor and scope, but in general across presupposition projection environments.
These sentences can also be varied to provide further evidence for the claim that,
without a filtering indefinite, definites project uniqueness. If we change the indefinite
predicate ‘buy a sage plant’ to ‘go to the plant store’ in these examples, then the
sentences become incoherent:
(34) ??Sue went to the plant store and bought eight sage plants along with the sage
plant she bought.
(35) ??Either Sue didn’t go to the plant store, or she bought eight sage plants along
with the sage plant she bought.
(36) ??Sue wants to go to the plant store. She wants to buy eight sage plants along
with the sage plant she wants to buy.
(37) ??Sue has to go to the plant store. She has to buy eight sage plants along with
the sage plant she has to buy.
This incoherence is of course readily explained if definites without filtering indefinites
project uniqueness.
Generalized sage plant sentences thus provide further support for definiteness pro-
jection. But they do so in a particularly simple way. By contrast to the arguments that
we have looked at so far, in the present case the only relevant judgment is whether a
given sentence (or sequence of sentences) is coherent; we do not need to reflect on
different contexts of assertion in order to see that uniqueness doesn’t project when
there is a filtering indefinite, and does otherwise.
4 Prospects for an e-type theory
We have argued that indefinites filter the uniqueness presuppositions of definites, while
those presuppositions project in other cases. We have argued for this by looking at a
wide variety of filtering environments: conditionals, quantifiers, conjuncts, disjuncts,
attitude reports, and modal claims. In each of these environments, we have shown that,
when there is a definite in the filtered position and an indefinite in the filtering position,
there is no corresponding uniqueness inference; whereas when there is no indefinite in
the filtering position, there is a corresponding uniqueness inference. We have shown
this both by comparing each of these variants in singular versus plural contexts; and
by exploring variants of sage plant sentences in each of these environments. It thus
looks as if definites carry an implication of uniqueness; and this implication is filtered
by corresponding indefinites. This is our central empirical claim in this paper.
We have claimed that extant e-type theories do not account for this pattern, which,
again, we call definiteness projection. In this section we will spell out the argument for
this claim in more detail, and explore to what extent e-type theories could be modified
to account for the observed pattern.
The basic argument is simple, and we will rehearse it one more time. According
to e-type theories, indefinites have the semantics of classical existential quantifiers:
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sentences containing indefinites just say that something of the relevant kind exists.
Sentences containing definites presuppose that a uniquely salient thing of the relevant
kind exists. Indefinites entail existence, but not uniqueness; but on standard assump-
tions, when a sentence ϕ is in a filtering position relative to a sentence ψ , ϕ will filter
exactly the presuppositions of ψ which ϕ contextually entails. So e-type theories pre-
dict that, in general, indefinites should filter existence but not uniqueness—contrary
to the observations here that indefinites appear to filter uniqueness.
How might e-type theorists respond to this argument?
Let us begin by dismissing one prima facie attractive, but on reflection implausible,
response. That response would slightly vary the e-type treatment of indefinites, so that
they entail not only existence but also uniqueness. This would, of course, account for
definiteness filtering. But it is untenable. For instance, it would make the sage plant
sentence (7) equivalent to the variant in (38):
(7) Everybody who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with it.
(38) Everybody who bought exactly one sage plant here bought eight others along
with it.
But these are plainly not equivalent: if (38) is ever true, it is only ever trivially true;
whereas, again, (7) can obviously be non-trivially true.
Once we set aside this response, the most natural place to look for a solution to
the present problems is by way of the mechanism that e-type theories have used to
get rid of certain uniqueness inferences in conditionals and quantified environments:
namely, minimal situations. As we saw at the outset, e-type theories predict the lack
of uniqueness in donkey sentences by making sure that the scopes/consequents of
quantifiers/conditionals can be assessed at minimal situations which witness their
restrictors/antecedents. At this point in the dialectic, that move looks rather parochial:
the pattern that is accounted for in that case by way of minimal situations is just
one instance of a much more general pattern. But perhaps similar moves could be
made across the board to account for the more general pattern. We will argue that
this strategy has some promise, but hits a wall when it comes to intersentential
filtering.
We’ll start by laying out in more detail what we take to be a reasonable baseline
e-type theory. To begin with, consider a sentence with a definite description like (39):
(39) The cat came in.
If ‘the cat’ presupposes there is a unique cat, then we don’t want to say that this
presupposition has to be satisfied in the world as a whole (since it isn’t, heaven forbid).
A more natural thing to say is that we tend to evaluate sentences like (39) at a topic
situation:21 that bit of the world that we are paying attention to or care about in
evaluating a sentence like this—and which presumably will only have one cat in it
whenever a sentence like (39) is felicitous.
21 The idea of a topic situation that a sentence is about goes back to Austin (1950); for discussion and
references see Kratzer (2019, Sect. 3).
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Sentences as a whole are thus evaluated relative to topic situations; sentences
embedded under operators can be evaluated relative to shifted situations of various
kinds (shifting operators in this context include classic intentional operators, like
modals and conditionals, as well as quantifiers, which are classically treated as exten-
sional operators but in the present context are more naturally treated as intensional). In
Sect. 2.2 we gave a gloss on sentences involving ‘every’ on which the uniqueness pre-
supposition of definites in scopes/consequents varies with minimal situations which
witness the restrictor, so that the presupposition is evaluated relative to those minimal
situations. As we discussed, this move is required in an e-type framework to deal with
sage plant sentences like (7), repeated again here:
(7) Everybody who bought a sage plant here bought eight others along with it.
There are different ways we could implement this idea; the differences do not really
matter for present purposes. For concreteness, here is a simple approach. We assume
that definites are indexed with a situation variable, which will provide us with the
place to check the definite’s presuppositions. That is, where g is a variable assignment
and s is a situation:
(40) [The F]i Gg,s
a. presupposes there is a unique F in g(i);
b. where the presupposition is satisfied, is true iff the unique F in g(i) is G
in s.
We assume pronouns are treated the same way, with covert descriptive material some-
how made available. We assume further that there are two options for how the situation
index on definites is set. One option is to set the index to the topic situation (the option
that is presumably taken in (39)). The second option is to set it to a designated variable
r which quantifiers manipulate.22 We can then give a semantics for quantifiers along
the following lines (where ≤ is the parthood ordering on situations):
(41) Everyx (p)(q)g,s= 1 iff, for every a, for every minimal s′ ≤ s such that
pg[x→a],s′= 1, there is a situation s′′ : s′ ≤ s′′ ≤ s : qg[x→a,s′→r ],s′′ = 1.
This will enable us to have a reading available on which sage plant sentences have
the correct truth conditions. In particular, we assume that ‘it’ or ‘the sage plant’ in the
nuclear scope is indexed with r . Then its presuppositions will be assessed relative to
minimal restrictor situations, which will contain exactly one sage plant, and thus will
satisfy its presuppositions. So in particular the uniqueness presuppositions of ‘it’/‘the
sage plant’ will be satisfied, yielding intuitive, non-trivial truth conditions for sage
plant sentences.
Given these two options, we predict that, for definites in the nuclear scope of
quantifiers, there are two ways their uniqueness presuppositions can be satisfied: either
22 More realistically, as Simon Charlow points out, we will need arbitrarily many such variables; we
simplify by assuming that there is just one dedicated such variable.
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by being satisfied in the minimal restrictor situations or by being satisfied in the topic
situation. This covers the basic cases.23
This gives us a reasonable baseline framework for indefinites, definites, and quan-
tifiers.24 We can now enrich this with a semantics for conditionals along similar lines.
Let us emphasize that our aim in laying this out is not to do anything new, but rather
simply to lay out in more detail what we take to be a reasonable state-of-the-art e-
type theory. This, in turn, lets us think more carefully about how e-type approaches
account for donkey sentences, and whether this approach can be extended to deal with
definiteness projection.
At an abstract level, an e-type approach like the present one deals with donkey data
by giving a semantics on which (i) restrictors/antecedents make available minimal
witness situations of the indefinite, and (ii) the semantics of the quantifier/conditional
makes sure that the presuppositions of the definite are evaluated at those minimal
witness situations. Can the present strategy be extended to account for the same pattern
in filtering environments across the board? In other words, can we develop a system
in which indefinites in filtering position always make available minimal situations
against which the presuppositions of the corresponding filtered definite are checked?
To give a sense of what we have in mind, consider an entry for conjunction like
this:
(42) p and qg,s= 1 iff pg,s= 1 and for some minimal situation s′ ≤ s s.t.
pg,s′= 1, qg[s′→r ],s= 1.
This extends the apparatus of minimal situations to ensure that in a conjunction with
the form ∃FG ∧ ιF H, uniqueness presuppositions can be satisfied. The idea is
that, when we have a definite in a right conjunct indexed with our designated situation
variable r , that definite’s presuppositions will be evaluated relative to a minimal left-
23 A further thing we might say is that these are the only available options. This further stipulation is not
essential for present points, but it is relevant to the overall picture, as it is a way to ensure that definites
and indefinites don’t end up meaning the same thing in the restrictors of quantifiers. The point goes back to
Büring (2004), who argued using the following sentence that we cannot evaluate uniqueness presuppositions
in the situation of evaluation.
(i) Every Athenian worships the goddess.
His thought, in essence, was that (i)’s truth conditions would be as follows:
(ii) In the topic situation s every minimal situation s′ < s containing an Athenian can be extended to a
situation s′′ : s′ < s′′ < s such that the Athenian in s′′ worships the goddess in s′′.
It would seem, then, that (i) would be equivalent to (iii):
(iii) Every Athenian worships a goddess.
However, it is clearly not. Büring thus suggests we restrict the indexing on the definite to avoid this predicted
equivalence, forcing an indexing to the restrictor situation or the topic situation. However, we might note
that once we add a systematic presupposition projection framework, the uniqueness presuppositions in (i)
might project out in a rather strong way, so it is not entirely clear that restrictions on the indexing of definites
are really necessary.
24 It’s not clear that this framework can deal with bishop sentences, a classic issue for e-type theories, but
we don’t have anything new to say about this issue.
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conjunct situation; so, if the left conjunct contains an indefinite, those presuppositions
will be satisfied.
We can say something similar about disjunction:
(43) p or qg,s= 1 iff pg,s= 1 or for some minimal situation s′ ≤ s s.t. pg,s′=
0, qg[s′→r ],s= 1.
Whether this works depends on some subtle issues about negation, which is a notori-
ously complex affair in situation semantics (see Kratzer 1989). However, if we treat
negation in the standard Boolean way, then (43) looks like it might do the trick. Sup-
pose a left disjunct is a negated indefinite and the right disjunct contains a definite
indexed to r . The presuppositions of that definite will be evaluated relative to a minimal
situation which makes the indefinite true, and hence will be satisfied, as desired.
So there are resources available to e-type theories to extend their treatments of
donkey sentences to other connectives. The system sketched here accounts for the
data we have reviewed involving conjunctions and disjunctions. Indeed, if the present
arguments are correct, it seems that something like this system is in fact forced on
e-type theorists. But there are a number of worries one might have about this picture.
We will lay out three, in order of increasing seriousness.
First, one might have thought it to be an attractive feature of e-type theories that they
can adopt classical semantics for the connectives. Although we don’t know of explicit
claims to this effect, we suspect that e-type theorists have largely taken for granted that
their theories of (in)definites and quantifiers can be coupled with classical connectives,
given the lack of discussion in this literature of how to treat ‘and’ and ‘or’ in this
framework. Critical responses to dynamic semantics have often focused on the fact that
dynamic semantics requires apparently arbitrarily non-classical connectives (see Heim
1990b; Soames 1989; Schlenker 2008; Mandelkern 2019). The present discussion,
however, suggests that e-type theories are not better off in this respect than dynamic
ones, since connectives along the lines of (42) and (43) are decidedly non-classical.
In fact, they look somewhat like the standard non-classical connectives of dynamic
semantics. So the need for these non-classical connectives may undermine one putative
motivation for e-type theories; in any case, it brings e-type theories somewhat closer
to dynamic theories.
Second, the pattern of definiteness projection, as we have emphasized, looks like
presupposition projection in general: the generalization we argued for was that indef-
inites filter uniqueness presuppositions of definites whenever those indefinites appear
in standard presupposition-filtering environments. The present approach accounts for
this pattern in the case of conjunctions and disjunctions, but not by treating it as a
species of presupposition projection in general: the apparatus of minimal situations in
the semantics in (42) and (43) ensures that uniqueness will be filtered by indefinites,
but it does not account for presupposition projection more broadly speaking. To see the
point, compare again conjunctions like ‘Susie used to smoke and she stopped’ versus
‘Susie ran a marathon and she stopped smoking’. As we saw above, the presupposition
of ‘Susie stopped smoking’, that Susie used to smoke, survives only in the latter of
these. The standard way of accounting for this is by means of some kind of asymmetric
conjunction (e.g. a dynamic conjunction like that of Heim 1983b, or a middle Kleene
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one like that of Peters 1979). But the minimal-situation-passing conjunction in (42)
is no help at all in capturing this pattern. In fact, when there is no definite in the right
conjunct indexed to r , the conjunction in (42) is just a classical conjunction. So some-
thing more will need to be said about presupposition projection across conjunction.
Similar points go, mutatis mutandis, for disjunction, and indeed for quantifiers and
conditionals.25 Of course, it is open to e-type theories to say more—to adopt a dynamic
or trivalent conjunction which incorporates the architecture of (42), and likewise for
disjunction. Our point is simply that the mechanism these approaches take to deal with
the filtering of uniqueness does not deal with presupposition projection more gener-
ally; and, conversely, whatever accounts for presupposition projection more generally
will not account for our pattern, for by-now familiar reasons, since, again, indefinites
do not entail uniqueness, and so cannot filter uniqueness presuppositions. In other
words, these approaches must take a disjunctive approach to definiteness filtering and
presupposition filtering, respectively.
Moreover, this does not seem to be an incidental feature of the system we have
developed here: it seems like it will be an essential feature of any e-type system.
Consider (44), from an anonymous referee for this journal:
(44) Every farmer who owns a donkey is aware that she has only one donkey.
In (44), the indefinite ‘a donkey’ does not filter the uniqueness presupposition of
‘aware that . . . ’, namely that each farmer in question has only one donkey. Instead, (44)
intuitively presupposes that every farmer who has a donkey has exactly one donkey. So
as a general matter, it looks like indefinites cannot filter uniqueness. This is of course
not surprising: we would not expect an indefinite, on any plausible semantics, to entail
uniqueness, and so we would not expect an indefinite, on any plausible account of
presupposition projection, to filter uniqueness presupposition. Thus, if we want to say
that definites have uniqueness presuppositions which are filtered by indefinites, as e-
type theories do, we simply cannot assimilate this process to presupposition filtering
in general. Maybe there are two systems here, one for presupposition filtering and one
for the filtering of uniqueness presuppositions in particular. But we have shown that
25 It is tempting to think that the familiar tool of growing minimal situations might somehow help with
presupposition projection. The idea would be this: say that ϕ ∧ψ is true just in case a part of the situation
of evaluation is a minimal ϕ-situation which can be grown to be a ψ-situation. But this doesn’t work because
of the conjunctive sage-plant sentences discussed above, like ‘Sue bought a sage plant and bought eight
other sage plants with it’. The ‘it’ here needs to be able to pick up on minimal left-conjunct situations,
and to implement this we need something like the co-indexing mechanism we have proposed here. But
once we have that mechanism, there is no argument from anaphora for incorporating situation-growing into
the semantics. What if, in spite of its redundancy, we incorporated both minimal-situation coindexing and
situation-growing? Besides being unmotivated, it’s not at all clear how this would help with presupposition
projection. Suppose that we adopt a theory of conjunction along these lines. Compare ‘Sue used to smoke
and she stopped smoking’ vs. ‘Sue used to live in Brazil and she stopped smoking’. Consider a situation
of evaluation where Sue used to smoke, used to live in Brazil, and does not now smoke. Then both of
these sentences will be simply true on the proposed semantics: they will have exactly the same status. But
theories of presupposition projection are supposed to predict a difference between sentences like this: a key
data point in these theories is that the first sentence does not presuppose that Sue used to smoke, while the
second one does. This prediction does not fall out of a situation-growing conjunction. More generally, it’s




these patterns coincide in a quite systematic way. This is something that calls out for
explanation.
The third, and most serious, worry about the extended e-type approach we have
sketched comes from the filtering of definiteness across sentences. The problem is
simple: the mechanism of minimal situations under consideration depends on the
indefinite and definite appearing under one operator. The idea is that that operator,
on top of its normal job, quantifies over minimal situations which witness the first
argument, and sets the designated situation variable for the second argument to those
minimal situations. But now suppose that the indefinite and the definite appear in
different sentences. Then there is no single operator which can do this job, i.e. pass on
minimal situations from the indefinite to the definite.
To make this worry more concrete, think about a ‘want’-‘want’ sequence. As we
have seen, indefinites filter uniqueness across environments like S wants ϕ. S wants
ψ ., as in (27a), repeated here:
(45) Mark wants to meet a man. He wants the man to be interesting.
What would it take to extend the minimal situation approach to a sequence of sentences
like that in (45)? In other words, how could the present approach predict that (45) has
no uniqueness presupposition? What we would want, if we are to extend the present
strategy, would be something along the following lines, where BoulM,s is the set of
situations compatible with Mark’s wants in s:26
(46) (45)g,s=1 iff ∀s′ ∈ BoulM,s : Mark meets a mang,s′ = 1 and for some
minimal situation s′′ ≤ s′ s.t. Mark meets a mang,s′′ = 1, [the man]r
is interestingg[s′′→r ],s
′ = 1
This will filter uniqueness as desired. It is straightforward to get this meaning for a
sentence with the form ‘Mark wants to meet a man and for him be interesting’; indeed,
that is what we get from the minimal-situation conjunction given above together with
a simple quantificational semantics for ‘want’. But we see no way to get this meaning
for the ‘want’-‘want’ sequence in (45) using the resources standardly available to e-
type theories. The problem is that there is no operator in that sequence which takes
scope over both the indefinite and the definite, and so no operator which can pass on
minimal situations from the indefinite to the definite. What we will get instead for a
sequence like (45) is a meaning like this:
(47) (45)g,s=1 iff ∀s′ ∈ BoulM,s : Mark meets a mang,s′ = 1 and ∀s′ ∈
BoulM,s : The man is interestingg,s′ = 1
Could this, after all, be sufficient?27 One thought here might be that, if Mark’s want-
situations are small enough, then each will contain only one man; and perhaps the
definite here can be indexed with a variable which somehow co-varies with the ‘want’-
situations. Setting aside questions of how exactly this would be implemented, we can
26 This assumes a simple quantificational semantics for ‘want’, but nothing turns on this assumption.
27 Thanks to Simon Charlow for very helpful discussion here.
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dispense with this response by considering again variants of sage-plant sentences in
‘want’-‘want’ sequences, as in (48):
(48) Mark wants to meet a man. He wants to meet eight other men along with
[him/the man].
The puzzle for this approach would be how to deal with the fact that the uniqueness of
‘him’/‘the man’ is filtered in (48) if we have truth conditions along the lines of those
in (47). Then we would have the following:
(49) (48)g,s=1 iff ∀s′ ∈ BoulM,s : Mark meets a mang,s′ = 1 and ∀s′ ∈
BoulM,s : Mark meets eight other men along with [him/the man]g,s′ = 1
If we try to do away with uniqueness by holding that Mark’s want-situations contain
just one man each, as we might in the case of (45), then the second sentence in (48)
could not be true. But clearly this whole sequence can be true and well-defined without
ascribing any incoherence to Mark.
In sum: what we would need to extend the e-type strategy to ‘want’-‘want’
sequences would be co-indexation of ‘him’/‘the man’ with minimal meet-a-man sit-
uations from the prior sentence. But to achieve this using the standard resources of
e-type theories, we would need one operator taking scope over both of these strings, in
order to feed minimal situations to the definite for evaluating its presupposition. But
such an operator is exactly what we don’t have here.
Similar points go for every other intersentential filtering environment: sequences of
attitude reports, sequences of modals, and, most simply, unembedded intersentential
anaphora. We will not go through these environments in detail, since the point is the
same in each case. The present strategy relies on an operator to pass on minimal
indefinite-witnessing situations to the definite. Yet in such sequences, no operator
takes scope over both the indefinite and the definite, and so no operator is available to
do what is required.
Let us consider briefly two ways that e-type theories might respond. The first sug-
gestion comes from an anonymous referee for this journal. The idea is that, since
e-type theories are anyways in the business of enriching sentences with unpronounced
material, we could say that a sequence with the form S wants ϕ. S wants ψ . can in
fact be interpreted S wants ϕ. S wants ϕ and ψ ., with the struck-through material
unpronounced. (A mechanism along similar lines was proposed, for different reasons,
in Rothschild (2017).) If we combine this interpretation with our situation-passing con-
junction from above, this would account for the filtering behavior in these sequences.
This is an interesting idea, but we think it unlikely to be correct. Let us make two points.
The first is an abstract one. Enrichment mechanisms like NP-deletion (Elbourne’s solu-
tion to the formal link problem) are independently attested, and (thus) independently
constrained. By contrast, the kind of enrichment mechanism under consideration here
is (at present at least) totally unconstrained. Second, this kind of enrichment mecha-
nism can only account for a limited portion of the relevant data. To see this, consider
this variant on our ‘want’-‘want’ sequence:
123
Definiteness projection
(50) Mark wants to meet a man. Sue wants [him/the man] to be interesting.
Sequence (50) does not have a reading on which it is equivalent to (51):
(51) Mark wants to meet a man. Sue wants to meet a man and for [him/the man]
to be interesting.
So the filtering of the uniqueness presupposition of [him/the man] in (50) cannot be due
to an enrichment mechanism of the kind under consideration here (that uniqueness
is filtered in sequences like (50) can be confirmed by the same tests used above).
This means that an enrichment approach like this faces two challenges: (i) to explain
why such enrichment is not available for sentences like (50); (ii) to find an alternate
explanation of the filtering of uniqueness in (50). Even if the first challenge can be
met, we suspect that any alternate explanation of sequences like (50) will also account
for our original ‘want’-‘want’ sequences, making an enrichment mechanism like this
otiose.
The second way we can imagine for e-type theories to get a meaning like the one in
(46) for a sentence like (45) is by invoking some kind of mechanism that lets us pass
information about indefinites between sentences: a mechanism that somehow records
the indefinite in the first sentence and passes this record on for the definite to pick up in
the second sentence. For instance, we could think about indefinites as being associated
with a variable and recording their information in the context’s variable assignment—
information that co-indexed definites could then pick up to satisfy their uniqueness
presupposition. We think this is probably the correct way to deal with sequences like
this in a broadly e-type framework. But any way of spelling this out will move us
solidly towards the territory of dynamic semantics: this kind of sequential updating of
variable assignments is, of course, one of the hallmarks of dynamic semantics. There
might be a view to be developed here which still incorporates some features of e-type
theories, and it is hard to pronounce on what exactly a theory like this would like look
without its being developed in full. But it seems likely to us that any successful account
of intersentential binding along the lines we have suggested will end up looking a lot
more like standard dynamic semantics than standard e-type theories do.
The dialectic here is complicated, so let us summarize. We have argued that e-
type theories do not naturally account for definiteness projection, and for definiteness
filtering in particular, since, on e-type theories, indefinites entail only existence, not
uniqueness. We have explored how e-type systems might be extended to account for
definiteness filtering. Rather than treating this phenomenon as presupposition pro-
jection, e-type theories could try to generalize the minimal-situation apparatus they
already use to account for definiteness filtering between restrictors/antecedents and
scopes/consequents. This generalization seems possible for ‘and’ and ‘or’. However,
the resulting system departs from classical treatments of the connectives, which is
arguably one of the attractions of e-type systems, and it must posit two systems—
presupposition projection, on the one hand, and minimal-situation-passing, on the
other—to account for a phenomenon that looks unified. Most seriously, it cannot
obviously account for intersentential filtering of uniqueness, and so does not look like
it will be empirically adequate. When an indefinite filters uniqueness for a correspond-
ing definite in another sentence, there is no operator in place that can pass on minimal
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indefinite-witnessing situations to satisfy the definite’s uniqueness presupposition.
Instead, what we would need to implement such a system would be a mechanism that
records the information carried in indefinites across sentences, and makes that infor-
mation available to corresponding definites; in other words, we would need a system
which updates variable assignments as discourse proceeds. That is, of course, exactly
what dynamic semantics provides. So to satisfactorily implement an e-type theory, it
looks like we would need a dynamic theory of variable updating in the background.
A hybrid theory along these lines might have its own attractions; but once we have
on hand the standard dynamic updating apparatus, the motivation for retaining other
key pieces of the e-type framework becomes less clear. Further exploration of hybrid
systems along these lines is clearly needed to evaluate these questions.
5 Dynamic semantics
Let us turn, finally, to consider the prospects of dynamic theories for accounting for
definiteness projection. A central upshot of our discussion of definiteness projec-
tion is that the phenomenon is intimately connected to presupposition projection: in
particular, indefinites appear to filter uniqueness implications of definiteness in the
same environments where presuppositions are filtered in general. This is a connection
that, again, e-type theories miss. By contrast, this connection is a central part of the
Heimian dynamic approach to presuppositions and definiteness (Heim 1982, 1983b),
which assimilates the processing of (in)definites and presupposition projection, as well
as of presuppositional developments of Kamp’s DRT system in van der Sandt (1989,
1992). We thus think that, from an abstract perspective, dynamic theories are better
situated than e-type theories to account for definiteness projection.
However, they still fall short of accounting for the full pattern. Unlike for e-type
theories, these shortcomings are known in the literature (though they have mostly
been discussed piecemeal, rather than in relation to the generalization of definiteness
projection). For this reason we will spend somewhat less time exploring these issues
than we did for the corresponding issues for e-type theories; we should emphasize that
this is not necessarily because they are less serious, but, again, because they are well
known in the literature.
To repeat, definiteness projection has two faces: (i) the uniqueness inferences of
definites are filtered by corresponding indefinites; but (ii) in the absence of such indef-
inites, definites generate uniqueness implications. As we saw, e-type systems have
serious problems accounting for the first part of this generalization; dynamic systems
face challenges accounting for both parts of the generalization.
We focus first on the first part of the generalization, definiteness filtering. While
dynamic systems can naturally account for some of the links between presupposition
projection and anaphora, they do not account for all the links that we highlight here.
For example, dynamic accounts easily explain the lack of uniqueness implications
when definite descriptions are used across sentences or under conjunctions: i.e. the
cases we discussed in Sects. 3.1 and 3.3. Indeed, dynamic systems were designed
exactly to cover these sorts of cases.
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But dynamic systems struggle to extend this coverage to the other contexts we
discuss, namely disjunctions (Sect. 3.4), attitude reports (Sect. 3.5), and modals (Sect.
3.6). These shortcomings have all been acknowledged and extensively discussed in
the literature. The problem for disjunction is particularly well known in the form of
the challenge to explain this famous example from Barbara Partee:
(52) Either this house doesn’t have a bathroom or it’s in a funny place.
To account for the presupposition projection behavior of disjunction generally,
dynamic accounts need to adopt a special semantics for disjunction, such as Beaver’s.
But merely adopting this kind of semantics for disjunction does not itself account for
the definiteness filtering of disjunction, for well-known technical reasons having to do
with the invalidity of double negation elimination in dynamic systems. Krahmer and
Muskens (1995) and Krahmer (1998) tackle this problem within a DRT framework,
while Rothschild (2017) tackles it by reformulating aspects of dynamic semantics in
a trivalent framework.
The problems dynamic semantics faces with respect to presuppositions and
anaphora across attitude reports are also well known, and there are various attempts
at expanding the dynamic framework to account for the data (Heim 1992; Cumming
2007; Sudo 2014; Maier 2015). Similarly, the challenges that dynamic semantics faces
in explaining presupposition projection across modalized sentences are known in the
literature (Roberts 1989). We will not explore these problems, or the solutions that
have been proposed, in detail. In sum, dynamic semantics naturally captures some, but
not all, of the connections between presupposition projection and uniqueness filtering.
We will not try to pronounce on how good the prospects for principled extensions of
dynamic semantics to cover these contexts are; but these shortcomings of dynamic
semantics are, again, well known in the literature.
The second challenge for dynamic semantics is accounting for the second part of our
generalization, uniqueness inferences: it is not clear how definites generate uniqueness
implications in the first place in dynamic systems. In Heim’s system (and similar devel-
opments since, e.g. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991; Dekker 1994), definites are not
associated with uniqueness presuppositions. Instead, they are associated with famil-
iarity presuppositions: definites are appropriate only when they are co-indexed with an
indefinite which has been introduced in the relevant context. This is a key part of how
dynamic semantics accounts for definiteness filtering, to the extent that it does. But it
is not obvious how a familiarity-based system would generate uniqueness inferences
at all. To see the issue, consider the sequence in (53):
(53) A: John went on a date.
B: Well, if John liked the woman, he’ll be happy he went out.
Here ‘the woman’ is felicitous, despite the lack of a preceding indefinite ‘a woman’. To
account for this, dynamic systems must countenance the possibility of accommodating
a discourse referent: making the definite be familiar by quietly adding an appropriate
discourse referent to the context. Now consider the same sentence in a plural context,
as in (54):
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(54) A: John went on dates with a few different women.
# B: Well, if John liked the woman, he’ll be happy he went out.
Why can’t we simply accommodate a discourse referent for ‘the woman’ in (54),
exactly as we do in (53)? Somehow the plural set-up seems to make this more difficult.
Superficially it feels as if this should be easy to explain. But it’s not clear to us how to
do so. After all, if ‘a date’ in (53) lets us somehow accommodate a discourse referent
for ‘the woman’—open a new file for this definite, in Heim’s metaphor—why doesn’t
‘dates with a few different women’ do the same in (54)? Indeed, one might think in
this case we could accommodate a few different discourse referents, and associate one
arbitrarily with ‘the woman’. At a high level the issue, again, is: how do we account for
the apparent uniqueness implications of definites like ‘the woman’ in (54) in a dynamic
system, where definites do not have uniqueness implications in the first place?
This problem has been recognized and discussed in the literature (Kadmon 1987,
1990; Szabó 2000; Roberts 2003).28 The generalization that our present exploration
points to is that dynamic theories undergenerate uniqueness implications in particular
in cases of accommodation. When we encounter a definite ‘ιF’ and no discourse
referent has been explicitly introduced which satisfies the property F , we must be
in a context in which there is at most one salient F-thing. In such a context, we can
accommodate an F-discourse referent. By contrast, if there is more than one salient
F-thing, we seem to be unable to accommodate a discourse referent for F : in plural
contexts without a filtering indefinite, definites lead to infelicity.
One way to explain this pattern is to posit constraints on the process of accommo-
dation. Indeed, Heim (1982, Ch. III, 5.2) notes that accommodation of a discourse
referent may be more than a matter of making the minimal required adjustment to
the context. Building on this idea, we might posit that, in order to accommodate a
new discourse referent for ‘the F’, we need to also accommodate the proposition that
there is only one relevant F . This stipulation is perfectly coherent but calls out for
explanation. One idea that might help explain this pattern is the suggestion of Szabó
(2000) that speakers have a dislike of arbitrariness in resolving anaphora. We could
spell this out as follows. The background assumptions would be standard Heimian
dynamic ones. Then we would add the assumption that speakers are able to accom-
modate discourse referents, but not arbitrarily. In other words, accommodation of a
discourse referent for ‘ιF’ can only work when there is at most one salient F-thing.
So, when there is at most one salient man, speakers can accommodate a discourse
referent for ‘the man’; by contrast, when there is more than one salient man, they will
not be able to do so, because this would require arbitrarily associating the definite
with some one of the salient men. When there is a filtering indefinite, however, no
accommodation at all will be required, and so these considerations will not come into
28 Roberts (2003) argues that definites presuppose there is a unique discourse referent. However, as she
recognizes, merely positing that ‘the F’ presupposes there is only one discourse referent that is an F
doesn’t itself explain why we get the implication that there is only one F in the contextually relevant
domain; Roberts tries to use quantity-based implicatures to fill the gap. Szabó (2000), by contrast, tries
to account for uniqueness implications by appeal to non-arbitrariness constraints. It is not clear to us that
either of these accounts delivers exactly the present generalization—namely, that uniqueness implications




play. This is an overall picture which strikes us as being motivated by the evidence we
have surveyed here. It is certainly a coherent picture. So dynamic semantics, in our
view, can likely be augmented in order to account for the generation of uniqueness
implications in cases of accommodation. But more work would be needed to explain
the underlying assumptions here. After all, when we encounter a definite with no cor-
responding discourse referent but many salient individuals who satisfy the definite’s
descriptive content, why not simply create a discourse referent, arbitrarily associating
it with one of the salient entities, in order to make for a coherent sequence?
In sum, then, Heimian dynamic semantics strikes us as somewhat better situated
than e-type theories to account for definiteness projection, insofar as the system is set
up from the start to assimilate presupposition projection and the licensing of definites.
However, dynamic semantics still faces (well-known) shortcomings in accounting for
both parts of our generalization.
6 Conclusion
Our main goal here has been to bring out the empirical contours of definiteness pro-
jection: definite descriptions and pronouns give rise to uniqueness implications, but
these implications can be filtered by preceding indefinites in the same way that pre-
suppositions are generally filtered. We have argued that the e-type approach faces
fundamental problems in accounting for this pattern. E-type theories have developed
strategies to account for some definiteness filtering in quantified sentences and con-
ditionals. But to account for definiteness filtering in general, these strategies would
need to be extended across the board. It is not at all clear that this can be done in
a satisfying way; in particular, doing so in intersentential cases looks as if it would
require something like dynamic variable updating. Dynamic semantics, which treats
definiteness and presupposition as akin from the start, is from an abstract point of
view in a somewhat better situation; nonetheless, extant versions of dynamic seman-
tics struggle to account for the full pattern of definiteness projection. Our central goal,
however, has not been to argue conclusively against any theory, but rather to bring out
in detail one central desideratum for any adequate theory of donkey anaphora: namely,
accounting for definiteness projection.
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